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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a non-jury verdict of guilty 
on the charge of theft by receiving under 76-6-408(1), (2) (a) 
(b), Utah Code Annotated (Supp. 1973). 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The defendant was convicted of theft by receiving 
of goods having a value of more than $250.00 but less than 
$1,000.00, a felony of the third degree. Defendant was sen-
tenced to an indeterminate term of zero to five years in the 
Utah State Prison and fined $500.00. Defendant was placed on 
probation for two years provided the fine was paid. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks a reversal of the non-jury verdict 
with directions from this court to dismiss the charges against 
her based on the point raised on appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The State and defendant stipulated (R. 51) to the 
following facts for purposes of this appeal as follows: 
Defendant was charged with the offense of theft by 
receiving, a second degree felony. She was found guilty of that 
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charge, but because of some conflict in the estimates of 
value of the property involved, the offense was determined 
to be a third degree felony. The evidence supporting the 
finding by the trial court, sitting without a jury, was as 
follows: 
1. William Barkley had stolen from his automobile 
on December 1, 1973, a small electric calculator, Exhibit 11. 
Larry J. Baker had stolen from him on August 21, 1974, an 
electrician's hand tool, Exhibit 12. 
2. On or about August 25, 1974, Intermountain 
Glass Company in Salt Lake City was burglarized, and numerous 
hand tools were stolen. Appellant, with her husband, owns a 
ranch in Duchesne County, Utah, and residing at the ranch are 
Appellant with her husband, the appellant's divorced daughter, 
and the daughter's school aged children. 
3. A search warrant issued in October 1974 which 
was timely served on the premises of the ranch in the absence 
of Appellant but while her husband was present. 
4. During the above search Exhibits 11 and 12 were 
recovered along with the personalty described in the return to 
the search warrant and portrayed in the pictures which were 
received as exhibits in this case, the documentary exhibits 
being made part of the record on appeal to the Supreme Court. 
Based on information supplied to the Salt Lake County Sheriff's 
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Office by an informant on the search warrant that the Inter-
mountain Glass tools had been sold to Appellant, and that she 
had been told of their origin, which Appellant denied during 
the trial, and based upon the finding of Exhibits 11 and 12 
during the course of the search of the ranch in Duchesne County, 
Utah, Appellant was charged with the felony offense of theft 
by receiving. 
POINT ON APPEAL 
SECTION 76-6-408, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
(SUPP. 1973) IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
The pertinent provisions of the Utah Code in issue 
in this case are as follows: 
"76-6-408(1). A person commits theft if 
he receives, retains, or disposes of the property 
of another knowing that it has been stolen, or who 
conceals, sells, withholds or aids in concealing, 
selling, or withholding any such property from the 
owner, knowing the property to be stolen, with a 
purpose to deprive the owner thereof. 
(2) The knowledge or belief required for 
paragraph (1) is presumed in the case of an actor 
who: 
(a) Is found in possession or control 
of other property stolen on a separate oc-
casion; or 
(b) Has received other stolen property 
within the year preceeding the receiving 
offense charged; ... (Emphasis added.)" 
Appellant contends the presumption created by this 
statute is unconstitutional in that it: (1) violates her right 
to a presumption of innocence and the corollary right that the 
State prove every element of the offense beyond a reasonable 
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doubt as embodied in Section 77-31-4 UCA (1953) and as 
demanded by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment; (2) violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment and the similar provision in Article I, Section 7 
of the Utah State Constitution, as being overly broad and 
vaguely drawn, and (3) it violates the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment as contrary to Supreme Court 
decisions in Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 89 S. Ct. 
1532, 23 L. Ed. 2d 57 (1969), Turner v. United States, 396 
U.S. 398, 90 S. Ct. 642, 24 L. Ed. 2d 610 (1970), Barnes v. 
United States, 412 U.S. 837, 93 S. Ct. 2357, 37 L. Ed. 2d 
380 (1973) . 
In Leary, supra, the court was faced with a nar-
cotics statute that created a presumption of knowledge on the 
part of the accused. In determining the validity of the pre-
sumption, the court said: 
"With regard to the knowledge1 pre-
sumption, we believe that Tot / Tot v. United 
States, 319 U.S. 463, 63 S^ Ct. 1241, 87 L. Ed. 
1519 (1943)J and Romano / United States v. 
Romano, 382 U^S. 136, 86 S. Ct. 279, 15 L. Ed. 
2d 210 (1965)_/ require that we take the statute 
at face value and ask whether it permits con-
viction upon insufficient proof of 'knowledge1. 
(395 U.S. 6 at 37) (Citations added.) 
Following the Supreme Court's reasoning we must 
take Section 76-6-408 at face value and examine its language 
and what it permits the trier of fact to do and on what evi-
dence. 
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The statute requires at least two elements to be 
shown without question: (1) that the defendant was in pos-
session of stolen goods, and (2) that defendant knew the 
goods were stolen. When the presumption is to be used, 
element # 2 is established by proof that defendant was in 
possession or control of property stolen on an occasion dif-
ferent from the one for which defendant is charged or that 
defendant received this other property within the year pre-
ceeding the offense charged. The practical effect is this: 
if the State cannot prove knowledge or its evidence is 
questionable or insufficient, all it need prove is other 
possession and the presumption attaches. 
It has been consistently held that a showing of 
mere possession without more cannot substantiate a presump-
tion of guilt as established by similar statutes. See, e.g. 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Sheppard, 229 Pa. Super. 42, 
324 A. 2d 522 (1974), State of Oregon v. Offord, 14 Or. App. 
195, 512 P. 2d 1375 (1973) and cases cited therein. Further-
more, it has been held that in order for the presumption to 
be constitutional, the fact proved must show beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the presumed fact is true. United States v. Johnson, 
140 U.S. App. D.C. 54, 433 F. 2d 1160 (1970), Wilbur v. Mullaney, 
473 F. 2d 943 (1st Cir. 1973), State v. Odom, 83 Wash. 2d 541, 
520 P. 2d 152 (1974). Barnes v. United States, supra, is not 
in opposite. In that case the Supreme Court was not faced with 
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a statute creating a presumption of guilt but with a common 
law rule of evidence creating an inference from all the sur-
rounding circumstances. The court said after examining the 
cases and the historical basis of the rule: 
"This impressive historical basis, how-
ever, is not in itself sufficient to establish 
the instructions constitutionality. Common-law 
inferences, like their statutory counterparts, 
must satisfy due process standards in light of 
present-day experience." (412 U.S. 837 at 845) 
The instruction given by the trial judge in Barnes, supra, 
reads in part: 
"However, you are never required to make 
this inference. It is the exclusive province of 
the jury to determine whether the facts and cir-
cumstances shown by the evidence in this case war-
rant any inference which the law permits the jury 
to draw from the possession of recently stolen 
property." (412 U.S. 837 at 840, n. 3) (Emphasis 
added.) 
In upholding the instruction as given, the court 
reviewed the evidence and found that both sides agreed defen-
dant was in possession of four recently stolen treasury checks; 
that payees of those checks had never received them; that a 
government witness, an expert in handwriting, testified that 
defendant had endorsed all four checks with his pseudonym and 
had also endorsed the name of the payee on two of the checks; 
that defendant testified he received the checks from people who 
sold furniture for him door to door, but that he could not name 
or identify any of the sales people; that defendant admitted 
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writing his pseudonym on each check; that defendant could not 
substantiate any furniture orders because the orders had been 
written on sratch paper which was not kept. 
"Such evidence was clearly sufficient 
to enable the jury to find beyond a reasonable 
doubt that petitioner knew the checks were 
stolen." (412 U.S. 837 at 845) 
The result in Barnes, supra, is similar to the 
result reached by the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Martinez, 
21 Ut.2d 187, 442 P. 2d 943 (1968), where in interpreting 76-38-1 
UCA (1953) and the language "prima facie evidence" the court found 
the statute created nothing more than a rule of evidence. It still 
was incumbent on the trier of fact to decide from the evidence 
whether or not an inference should be drawn. The trier of fact 
was not forced to make the inference but could if he wished. 
The "inference" or "prima facie evidence" rule has been upheld 
in virtually every jurisdiction with statutes of similar wording. 
This rule differs from the "presumption" rule now before us. 
State v. Georgopoulous, 27 Ut. 2d 53, 492 P. 2d 13 53 
(1972) in determining the admissibility of evidence of other 
stolen property for purposes of 76-38-12 UCA (1953) fits this 
pattern. The former 76-38-12 did not create any presumption. 
But the Utah Supreme Court allowed the evidence of other stolen 
goods to be admitted at the trial. This court held that this 
evidence could be used by the jury to help it decide if the 
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defendant knew that the goods for which he was arrested 
were stolen. Again, the court has created a rule of evi-
dence which permits the jury to reach its own judgment as to 
whether or not defendant had knowledge, i.e. to reach a per-
missible inference. Barnes, supra, would further require that 
the evidence be sufficient beyond a reasonable doubt. 
These rules are completely evaded by Section 76-6-
408, the statute now under consideration. The statute does not 
provide for any rule of evidence but rather provides for a legal 
presumption of knowledge and by virtue of the wording of the 
statute a presumption of guilt. 
It is apparent from the abbreviated record in this 
case that Judge Baldwin at the time of making his finding of 
guilty (R. 55) considered the "presumption" rule in the literal 
interpretation of the subject statute without regard to any 
number of standards considered by other courts in determining 
the sufficiency of proof. The court stated (P. 55): 
"I have to weigh the evidence. I 
think that Mr. Van Over and Mr. Brown have 
told a lot of falsehoods. (Paragraph 4 of 
stipulated statement of facts that the defen-
dant had been told of the origin of the stolen 
tools from Intermountain Glass). On the other 
hand, maybe some of it has some ring of truth. 
The fact that that much property was delivered 
(by Van Over and Brown), placed in a garage 
(the defendant's) and sold (to the defendant), 
in effect sight-unseen for $250, with no 
questions, who, how, why, when or where, 
couples together with whether it's posses-
sion or control or of other items stolen on 
several occasions in the home, I assume one 
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has control of one's own home even though 
someone else is living there; the bedroom, 
I have to find those other two items were 
stolen and end up in the possession of — 
I didn't say the ultimate possession of — 
of the defendant. The court, based upon 
the presumptions (statutory) , I would have 
to find the defendant guilty of receipt of 
property of a value of less than $1,000 and 
over $250." (Emphasis added.) 
Whether or not "presumption vs. inference" is 
constitutional at all is discussed in detail in "The Unconsti-
tutionality of Statutory Criminal Presumptions" Vol. 22, Stanford 
Law Review, page 341. At page 349, the writer notes the basic 
objections to such legal presumptions when he states (1) they 
permit verdicts based upon evidence insufficient to support a 
finding beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) they force the jury to 
make arbitrary decisions, and (3) they direct verdicts for the 
prosecution unconstitutionally. 
The writer further notes that when presumptions only 
have to pose the "rationale-connection test", a jury could 
find a person guilty on a quantum of evidence less than proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt of each and every element of the of-
fense. As in Leary, supra, Appellant here was found guilty 
because of a statutory presumption of knowledge, an instance 
in which the State Legislature attempted to nullify the pre-
sumption of innocence which is the highest and greatest pre-
sumption in the law. It would appear that State v. Georgopoulous, 
su£ra, and the permissible inference allowed by this Court have 
now been overridden. 
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It is obvious from Judge Baldwin's comments (TR. 55) 
that the sellers of the personalty to Appellant were of ques-
tionable reliability. It is further obvious from his comment 
"Based upon the presumptions..." that we have a presumptive 
questionable statute and no standard or criterion for overcom-
ing this very questionable practice in the law. Creating a 
presumption of knowledge of an act which occurs today based 
upon possession of other stolen property twenty years before 
or possession of property stolen 364 days beforehand does not 
necessarily to the exclusion of any other reasonable hypothesis 
even infer guilty knowledge. To do so is a clear violation of 
the concepts enunciated by the court in In re Winship, 397 U.S. 
358, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 25 L. Ed. 2d 368 (1970) that the State 
must prove every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Even accepting completely the State proved possession it does 
not necessarily follow that such possession proves beyond a 
reasonable doubt that knowledge was had, in violation of United 
States v. Johnson, supra, and violates the accepted rule that 
possession can substantiate a finding of guilt which the statute 
allows. This statute has taken a rule of evidence in the Utah 
case of Georgopoulous, supra, and turned it into a presumption 
of guilt. 
Leary, supra, has made it abundantly clear that before 
a statutory presumption can be constitutionally valid the State 
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must prove that the fact presumed must lead at least with 
"substantial assurance" to the presumed fact. 
The court quoted Tot, supra; 
"...The Court held that because of 
the danger of overreaching it was incumbent 
upon the prosecution to demonstrate that the 
inference was permissible before the burden 
of coming forward could be placed upon the 
defendant." (395 U.S. 6 at 45) 
In the Tot, supra, case the court was faced with a 
rule of evidence that a jury could infer from possession of 
a firearm that it came in interstate commerce. It should be 
remembered that this was only a permissible inference. The 
jury did not have to infer this knowledge. Only if the sur-
rounding circumstances and evidence warranted the inference 
in the minds of the jury need they so infer. But in the case 
at bar the presumption is demanded as the trial judge felt 
bound to so presume. This statute does not create a permis-
sible inference but a mandatory presumption as evidenced by 
the trial judge's statement. 
Following the rule of Leary and Turner, supra, it 
would appear that buyers of personalty must make an indepth 
investigation into the ownership, identity and source of all 
purchased goods. Even then an innocent buyer would not be 
protected because of the statutory presumption because of the 
unavailable criterion in this attempt to shift the burden of 
proof. 
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CONCLUSION 
There being no evidence that the legislative logic 
set forth in 76-6-408, UCA as amended, is necessarily true, 
i.e. that a person who possessed a stolen object on another 
occasion or possessed an object stolen within a year from 
the time he received a second stolen object, knew that the 
second object was stolen. The statute in question sets forth 
no reasonable standard to create a statutory presumption of 
knowledge. Likewise, such a presumption is unconstitutional 
as it violates the basic premise that a person is presumed 
guilty until each and every element of the offense is estab-
lished by direct or reasonably inferable conclusionable evi-
dence beyond a reasonable doubt under the facts and circum-
stances applicable to the cause before this court. Appellant 
respectfully requests the statutory presumption be struck down 
by this court as being contrary to the objection of this State 
and of the United States. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HATCH, McRAE & RICHARDSON 
BY. 
Robert M. McRae 
Attorney for Defendant-
Appellant 
370 East Fifth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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